Coram Nobis in Missouri by Crawley, J. Charles
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 20 Issue 3 
1935 
Coram Nobis in Missouri 
J. Charles Crawley 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. Charles Crawley, Coram Nobis in Missouri, 20 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 241 (1935). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss3/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
NOTES
public charity.5 The shoe, it would seem, should be on the other
foot.
The functional test places narrower limits to the number of
corporations the personnel of which Congress could control than
does the simpler test of mere corporate form. It is, however,
precisely the commercially engaged government corporations
which in the future may be in particular need of freedom from
political dictation by the executive. It is to be hoped that in such
an event the courts will be able to effect this liberation. The
combined factors of corporate form and participation in com-
mercial activities may assist the judicial process.
CHRISTIAN B. PEPER '35.
CORAM NOBIS IN MISSOURI
It might seem advisable as a matter of logical procedure in a
discussion concerning the nature and extent of the writ of error
cormm nobis that one's reasoning should start with the definition
of a judgment, and a consideration of the nature of a judicial
determination or sentence of a court in a cause within its juris-
diction. If we turn to that venerated authority Lord Coke, we
find that the learned judge characterized judgments as "the very
voyce of law and right."' It is true that every judgment directly
enforces some right or suppresses some wrong, thereby pro-
ducing the end sought by a humanely conceived law and that,
in truth, may be the "voyce of law and right."'* The meaning
of the word "judgment" as changed by the Missouri statute,
is defined as "the final determination of the right of the parties
in the action." 2 To start with the primary emphasis upon the
nature of a judgment demands that we never lose sight of the
fact that a judgment imports absolute verity, and is the highest
form of obligation. This is supported by the celebrated maxim:
It is to the interest of the state that litigation come to an end.3
A consideration, however, of the writ of error coram nobis
as one of the methods of vacating a judgment, seems to require
that the definition, nature and extent of this remedy should
be considered first, rather than that the nature of a judgment
be placed to the forefront. To accord the main emphasis to the
scope of the writ of error coram nobis does not mean that we
55 Supra page 236; and see examples of Congressional appointment cited
page 234.
'Co. Litt. 39 a. 1 Freeman on Judgments, 2.
11 1 Freeman on Judgments, 3.
2R. S. Mo. (1929), section 1070. Kansas City v. Wourshoeffer (1913)
249 Mo. 1, 155 S. W. 779; Orchard v. Wright-Dalton-Bell Anchor Stone Co.
(1910) 225 Mo. 414, 125 S. W. 486.
3 Jeude v. Sims (1914) 258 Mo. 26, 166 S. W. 1048.
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can disregard the absolute verity of a judgment, but this latter
line of thought does reverse any assumption in favor of the
judgment as a psychological fact and requires that the judicial
determination of the court run the gauntlet of the forms of
relief existent for setting aside judgments, as expressly granted
by statute or judicial decision.
It is an acknowledged power of a court to vacate its judg-
ments.4 This power to vacate judgments is entirely different
from the power to reverse judgments. It is a power inherent in,
and to be exercised by, the court which rendered the judgment,
and to that court and no other the application to set aside the
judgment should be made.5 It may be appropriate to point out
that many of the cases in this State are ambiguous and some-
what confuse the remedies which admittedly lie for the purpose
of vacating a judgment.6 The remedy by writ of error coram
4 Cross v. Gould (1908) 131 Mo. App. 585, 110 S. W. 672; Jeude v. Sims,
footnote 3, supra; Fisher v. Fisher (1905) 114 Mo. App. 627, 90 S. W. 413;
Shuck v. Lawton (1913) 249 Mo. 168, 155 S. W. 20; Reid v. Moulton (Mo.
1919) 210 S. W. 34; Boegemann v. Bracey (1926) 315 Mo. 437, 285 S. W.
992.
5 Calloway v. Nifong (1822) 1 Mo. 223 (writ of error brought assign-
ing as error in fact that co-defendant died before judgment. The court dis-
missed the writ of error and held that, according to the established course
of the common law, error in fact, could only be corrected in the court where
it accrued, or in which the record was. In this case the remedy was said
to be by writ of error coram nobis, in the circuit court, the record being in
that court); Jeffrie v. Robideaux (1831) 3 Mo. 33; Ex parte Toney (1848)
11 Mo. 661 (Habeas corpus proceeding to release a slave sentenced as a
free person. Writ denied. The court held that, for an error of fact in the
proceedings of a court of record civil or criminal, a writ of error coram
nobis would lie in that court to afford the complaining party relief); Ex
parte Kaufman (1881) 73 Mo. 588 (habeas corpus proceeding. The court
denied the writ and declared that as the fact did not appear in the record
and was not made known in the nisi prius court, they knew of fio law which
would authorize them to try the question as to whether the fact asserted
was true or false. The duty of trying the question was said to be in the
court where the trial was had); Marble v. Vanhorn (1893) 53 Mo. App. 361
(motion in the nature of a writ of error coiram nobis to set aside a judg-
ment retaxing costs in a cause which had been tried on the ground a blank
subpoena was issued and afterwards filled in. The court held that this writ,
and the present day motion we have as a substitute for it, is only addressed
to the court itself where the record lies); Baker v. Smith's Estate (Mo.
App. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d.) 147 (motion to set aside a judgment on the
ground that Smith was insane and a non-resident of the county in which
the probate court acted. Granted. Held, the proceeding under the writ or
the motion is at law, and not in equity, and lies only in the trial court
assuming the necessary jurisdictional fact); Hecht-Bro's. Co. v. Walker
(1931) 224 Mo. App. 1156, 35 S. W. (2d.) 372 (writ of error coram nobis
is only granted by the court granting the judgment); G. M. A. C. v. Lyman
(Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d.) 109 (the writ of error coram nobis will
lie only in the court when that court has proceeded in a case as though a
fact material to its right to proceed existed when it did not exist).
6 Craig v. Smith (1877) 65 Mo. 536 (In this case there was both a
patent error of record, i. e., the sheriff's return, which showed a non est
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss3/5
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nobis which today is pursued in a summary manner by motion,
and the remedy by motion to vacate the judgment for fraud
practiced in the very act of its procurement, in addition to the
remedy by motion for irregularity, obtain in the jurisprudence
of this State, and are evinced by a very large number of adjudi-
cated cases which will be more particularly adverted to in the
following discussion.7 There has been an inclination on the part
of some text-writers and jurists under the supposed and so-called
substitute therefore, the summary motion, to relegate the com-
as to the moving defendant, and an error of fact, in this, that the attorneys
representing two of the defendants [there being three including the movant]
had filed an answer for defendants without specifying for which defendants
the answer was intended, when they had no authority to appear for but two
and not for the party filing the motion to vacate the judgment. The court
held that, the motion to vacate and set aside the judgment for the alleged
irregularities or error in fact in the rendition of it, may be regarded as
in the nature of a writ of error ceram nobis, or as warranted under the
provision of our statute authorizing a motion for that purpose to be filed
within three years after such judgment was rendered); State ex rel. v.
Heinrich (1883) 14 Mo. App. 146 (the motion in State ex rel. v. Heinrich
the motion, while considered as in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis,
was in fact filed within three years after the rendition of the judgment and
a reopening of the case was authorized under the statute providing for a
review of the judgment within three years after its rendition); Graf v.
Dougherty (1909) 139 Mo. App. 56, 120 S. W. 661; Fisher v. Fisher (1905)
114 Mo. App. 627, 90 S. W. 413; Jeude v. Sims (1914) 258 Mo. 42, 166
S. W. 1048 Stacker v. Cooper Circuit Court (1857) 25 Mo. 401 (the writ
of error coram nobis [referred to as caram vobis] was used to set aside a
judgment for an irregularity patent of record. The court here said that a
court rendering an irregular judgment, such as might be recalled by writ of
error coram vobis, then the court may on motion correct the irregularity.
After an order of reference has been made, until the order is disposed of
no step can be taken in the cause towards obtaining a final judgment. As
the judgment was irregularly entered in disregard of the outstanding order
of reference, it was declared properly set aside) ; Cross v. Gould, footnote 4,
supra.
7 It is not within the purview of this note to comment on the other
remedies made available by statute and judicial decision-time and space
does not permit. In addition to the appeal prosecuted in due course and
the several motions authorized by law and practice during the term, the
modes of direct attack at a subsequent term on a prior judgment, for which
authority may be found in our books, are writs of error coram nobis, the
common-law writ audita querela, a motion to vacate for fraud in the act
of procuring the judgment, the motion to vacate for irregularities patent
of record, and the bill to review on equitable grounds. The common-law
writ audita querela is one by which a proceeding may be had by a judgment
defendant, in the court wherein the record lies, to review a judgment on
account of some matter occurring after judgment amounting to a discharge
of its obligation. This discussion must necessarily disregard the question
as to equity jurisdiction to entertain a bill in equity to review and vacate
a judgment. There is also another statutory proceeding very similar to the
motion for irregularities which has for its purpose the setting aside or
vacating final judgments, as where the defendant was not summoned as
required by statute or did not appear to the suit. This is the proceeding
for review provided for under R. S. Mo. (1929), section 1081.
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mon-law writ of error coram nobis to the limbo of innocuous
desuetude.8 The writ of error coram nobis is certainly not ob-
solete in Missouri. When the need for the writ arises its impor-
tance looms large, for as a rule it involves matter that goes to the
very foundation of the judgment. It is not as though the present
day motion involves the redefinition of rights, the recognition of
new interests, and the formation of new legal thought around
new principles. It has been said that the Code is not sufficiently
comprehensive to meet and deal with every varied phase which
a case may assume in its vicissitudes through the courts, and
therefore resorts must frequently be made to the ancient common
law procedure.9 To ignore the nature and office of the writ is to
ignore the line of distinction so essential to a complete under-
standing of the remedies aforementioned."0 As the authorities
concede that a judgment may now be vacated on motion for any
of the matters for which a writ of error coram %obis would
formerly lie, the consideration of the matters to which this
remedy was successfully applied is material. It will be more
satisfactory to a clear understanding of the writ of error coram
nobis, to consider separately three remedies for vacating a judg-
ment at a subsequent term, as ascertained and settled in the law
of Missouri, insofar as this procedure may tend to clarify and
set out the proper confines of the writ of error coram nobis."
In view of the above, it is deemed advisable to advert, first, to
the remedy by motion to vacate a judgment in the nature of a
writ of error coram nobis.
INTRODUCTION
The writ of error cpram nobis is a part of the common law to
which we have fallen heir.12 No statute in this State undertakes
to define this power of a court of general jurisdiction, nor do
our laws prescribe the procedure.13 We must look therefore to
the common law for the scope of the writ, as well as for the
8 Hartford Ins. Co. v. Stanfill (Mo. App. 1924) 259 S. W. 867; Baker v.
Smith's Estate (Mo. App. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d.) 147; Jeude v. Sims, supra
footnote 3; 1 Black on Judgments, section 300; 1 Freeman on Judgments,
517.
9 Tucker v. Ins. Co. (1876) 63 Mo. 594; Neenan v. St. Joseph (1894) 126
Mo. 89, 28 S. W. 963; Cross v. Gould, footnote 4, supra.
10 Jeude v. Sims, footnote 3, supra; Cross v. Gould, footnote 4, supra.
n No attempt will be made to discuss the nature and scope of the relief
which may be properly administered by the motion to vacate a judgment
for irregularities patent on the record and a motion to vacate for fraud in
the act of procuring, the judgment. These remedies will be considered only
to the extent that in their application they may clearly outline the scope
of the writ of error coram nobis.
'
2 Reed v. Bright (1911) 232 Mo. 399, 134 S. W. 653; Kings Lake Drain-
age District v. Winkelmeyer (Mo. App. 1933) 62 S. W. (2d.) 1101; Smith's
Estate v. Baker, footnote 6, supra; Cross v. Gould, footnote 4, supra.
"Reed v. Bright, supra footnote 12.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss3/5
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procedure. By statute, the common law of England, prior to the
fourth year of the reign of James the First, was adopted in this
respect, at least in this State, as the rule of decision, unless
changed or modified by Constitution or Statute. 4
The writ of error coram nobis and the writ of error coram
vobis lie for the correction of errors of fact.15 History shows
14 R. S. Mo. (1825) 491, Chap. 1, also referred to as "Digest." Now
R. S. Mo. (1929), section 645.
15 Calloway v. Nifong (1822) 1 Mo. 223; Ex parte Toney (1848) 11 Mo.
661; Powell v. Gott (1850) 13 Mo. 458, 53 Am. Dec. 153; Randalls v. Wilson
(1856) 24 Mo. 76; Stacker v. Cooper Circuit Court (1857) 25 Mo. 401;
Nelson v. Brown (1856) 23 Mo. 13; State v. Garner (1860) 30 Mo. 44;
Downing v. Still (1869) 43 Mo. 309; Townsend v. Cox (1870) 45 Mo. 401;
Stupp v. Holmes (1871) 48 Mo. 89; Groner v. Smith (1872) 49 Mo. 318;
Ex Parte Page (1872) 49 Mo. 291; Latshaw v. McNees (1872) 50 Mo. 381;
Craig v. Smith (1877) 65 Mo. 536; Weil v. Simmons (1877) 66 Mo. 617;
Ex parte Kaufman (1881) 73 Mo. 588; Ex parte Gray 1882) 77 Mo. 160;
Walker v. Deaver (1883) 79 Mo. 664; Hadley v. Bernero (1903) 103 Mo.
App. 549, 78 S. W. 64; Neenan v. St. Joseph (1894) 126 Mo. 89, 28 S. W.
963; State ex rel. Ozark County v. Tate (1892) 109 Mo. 265, 18 S. W. 1088;
State v. Stanley (1909) 225 Mo. 525, 125 S. W. 475; State ex rel. Potter
v. Riley (1909) 219 Mo. 667, 118 S. W. 647; Hartman v. Hartman (1911)
154 Mo. App. 243, 133 S. W. G69; State v. Wallace (1908) 209 Mo. 359, 108
S. W. 542; Dugan v. Scott (1889) 37 Mo. App. 663; State ex rel. Hudson
v. Heinrich (1883) 14 Mo. App. 146; Hirsh v. Weisberger (1891) 44 Mo.
App. 507; Cross v. Gould, supra footnote 4; Jeude v. Sims, supra footnote
3; Norton v. Reed (1920) 281 Mo. 482, 221 S. W. 6; Simms v. Thompson
(1922) 291 Mo. 493, 236 S. W. 876; Graves v. Graves (1914) 255 Mo. 468,
164 S. W. 496; Reed v. Bright, supra footnote 9; Davis v. Robinson (1907)
126 Mo. App. 293 102 S. W. 1048; State ex rel. v. Clarkson (1901) 88 Mo.
App. 553; Marble v. Vanhorn (1893) 53 Mo. App. 361; Hartford Ins. Co. v.
Stanfill (Mo. App. 1924) 259 S. W. 867; Karicofe v. Schwaner (1917) 196
Mo. App. 572, 196 S. W. 46; Callicotte v. C. R. I. R. R. (Mo. Sup. 1918)
204 S. W. 528; Schneider v. Schneider (Mo. App. 1925) 273 S. W. 1081;
State ex rel. Orr v. Latshaw (1922) 291 Mo. 592, 237 S. W. 770; Graf v.
Dougherty (1909) 139 Mo. App. 56, 120 S. W. 661; Warren v. Railway Con-
ductors (1918) 199 Mo. App. 200, 201 S. W. 368; Estes v. Nell (1901) 163
Mo. 157, 63 S. W. 724; Fisher v. Fisher (1905) 114 Mo. App. 627, 90 S. W.
413; Ragland v. Ragland (Mo. App. 1924) 258 S. W. 728; Heard v. Sack
(1884) 81 Mo. 610; Nave v. Todd (1884) 83 Mo. 601; State ex rel. Brown
v. White (1898) 75 Mo. App. 256; State ex rel. Wheat v. Horine (1895)
63 Mo. App. 1; Smith v. Young (1909) 136 Mo. App. 65, 117 S. W. 628;
Audsley v. Hale (1924) 303 Mo. 451, 261 S. W. 117; Fox-Miller Grain Co.
v. Stephans (Mo. App. 1920) 217 S. W. 994; Bruner v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.
(Mo. App. 1921) 233 S. W. 256; Degener v. Kelly (Mo. App. 1928) 6 S. W.
(2d.) 998; Gibson v. Pollock (1914) 179 Mo. App. 188, 166 S. W. 874; Scott
v. Rees (1923) 300 Mo. 123, 253 S. W. 998; Forest Lumber Co. v. Osceola
Mining Co. (Mo. Sup. 1920) 222 S. W. 398; Le Bourgoise v. McNamara
(1881) 10 Mo. App. 116, Aff. 82 Mo. 189; Metal Workers v. Mercantile Co.
(1926) 218 Mo. App. 544, 280 S. W. 82; Robinson v. Henry (Mo. App. 1929)
14 S. W. (2d.) 693; Baker v. Smith's Estate (Mo. App. 1929) 18 S. AV.
(2d.) 147; Sowers-Taylor Co. v. Collins (Mo. App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d.)
692; Mefford v. Mefford (Mo. App. 1930) 26 S. W. (2d.) 804; Moutier v.
Moutier (Mo. App. 1930) 25 S. W. (2d.) 490; Kings Lake Drainage Dis-
trict v. Winkelmeyer (Mo. App. 1933) 62 S. W. (2d.) 1101; Hecht-Bro's.
Co. v. Walker (1931) 224 Mo. App. 1156, 35 S. W. (2d.) 372; G. M. A. C.
v. Lyman (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d.) 109.
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that it was called a writ of error coram nobis in King's Bench,
because the record and proceedings were stated in the writ to
remain "before us." It was a fiction of old English law that the
King was supposed to preside in person in that court. In the
court of Common Pleas, where the King was not supposed to
preside, the writ was called a writ of error coram vobis, because
the record and proceedings were stated in the writ to remain
"before you," meaning the King's justices.10 The difference re-
ferred only to the form appropriate to each court, neither of
which exists in the United States, and as a result there is no
difference between a writ of error coracm -nobis and a writ of
error corcam vobis in this country.17 It is, of course, a matter of
common knowledge that we had no king, to say nothing of a
cursitor, that all writs need not be issued out of Chancery, and
that our circuit courts combined many of the features of both
the Common Pleas and Kings Bench. If we turn to early Mis-
souri cases we find that the writ is called coram nobis or coram
vobis indiscriminately.16 With attention still focused on these
cases, it is shown that in our practice a motion is considered as
an application for a writ of error corcm nobis.9 The writ, being
heard in the same court which issues it, is actually never issued
at all, but the matter is determined upon a hearing of the matters
raised in the application (in the form of a motion) as if a formal
writ had been issued.20 The proceeding under the writ or the
motion is at law and not in equity.2' It applies equally to civil
or criminal proceedings.22
6 Baker v. Smith's Estate, supra footnote 5; Cross v. Gould, supra foot-
note 4; Tidd's Practice, 512.
17 Ibid. Respectable authority has stated that the writ of error coram
nobig is to be distinguished from the writ of error coram vobis in that, the
latter is returnable before some superior tribunal, and required the record
and proceedings to be certified to such tribunal for its revisory action.
Freeman on Judgments, section 94; Camp v. Bennett 16 Wend. 48. See
further 97 Am. St. Rep. 366 and cases cited therein.
18 Ex parte Toney (1848) 11 Mo. 661 (coram 'vobis); Powell v. Gott(1850) 13 Mo. 458 (coram nobis) ; Stacker v. Cooper Circuit Court (1857)
25 Mo. 401 (coram vobis); Nelson v. Brown (1856) 23 Mo. 13 (coram
vobis). As early as 1822 the Supreme Court referred to the writ as coram
nobis in Calloway v. Nifong, supra footnote 5.
19 Ibid.
20 State ex rel. Potter v. Riley, supra footnote 15; Simms v. Thompson,
supra footnote 15; Davis v. Robinson, supra footnote 15; Baker v. Smith's
Estate, supra footnote 6; Sowers-Taylor Co. v. Collins, supra footnote 15;
Jeude v. Sims, supra footnote 3; Ragland v. Ragland, supra footnote 15.
21 Baker v. Smith's Estate, supra footnote 6; Jeude v. Sims, supra foot-
note 3; Cross v. Gould, supra footnote 4.
22 Calloway v. Nifong, supra footnote 5; Ex parte Toney, supra footnote
15; Powell v. Gott, supra footnote 15; Randalls v. Wilson supra footnote
15; Ex parte Gray (1882) 77 Mo. 160; Ex parte Kaufman (1881) 73 Mo.
588; Stacker v. Cooper Circuit Court, supra footnote 15.
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SCOPE OF THE WRIT
If we then give our primary attention to the scope and mean-
ing of the writ of error coram nobis, certain conclusions will in-
evitably force themselves upon us with regard to the scope of the
writ. The writ of error coram nobis, and the present day mo-
tion, as a substitute, is addressed to the court in which the
record is, and lies to correct some latent matter of fact unknown
to the court, which, if known, would have prevented the rendi-
tion and entry of the judgment.23 As the writer understands the
authorities, the writ does not lie for some unknown fact going
to the merits of the cause, but rather for some unknown fact
relating to the right of the court to proceed which entirely de-
feats the power of the court to attain a valid result in the pro-
ceeding.24 It is not the office nor within the purview of a motion
of a writ of error coram nobis to give a new trial merely because
certain facts in the nature of evidence going to the merits of the
cause were undiscovered by a litigant in time for use at the
original trial.25 The matter of fact which is meant in this con-
nection is such a character of fact as would, if known, disable
23 G. M. A. C. v. Lyman (1935), supra footnote 15 (the fact must be one
going to the right of the court to proceed, and which entirely defeats the
power of the court to obtain a valid result in the proceedings); Hecht-
Bro's. Co. v. Walker (1931), supra footnote 15 (the fact must be such a
fact, that, had it been known to the court at the time of the rendition of
the judgment, such judgment would not have been entered); Kings Lake
Drainage District v. Winkelmeyer (1933), supra footnote 15; Sowers-Taylor
Co. v. Collins (1929), supra footnote 15; Fox-Miller Grain Co. v. Stephans
(1920), supra footnote 15; Smith v. Young (1909), supra footnote 15. See
further cases collated in footnote 15.
An application for the writ of error coram nobis may be directed to an
appellate court. Note the language in Hartford Ins. Co. v. Stanfill: "At
the outset we were struck with a doubt as to whether we possess the right
to entertain this motion because of our limited jurisdiction. However, we
may assume, because of our inherent power and control over our own judg-
ments, that we may entertain a motion of this kind when predicated upon
a proper circumstance and state of facts. While we are unable to find a
direct expression in our reported cases touching the question of our power
to entertain such motion, it appears, however, in the case of State v. Stanley
(1909) 225 Mo. 525. 125 S. W. 475, that our Supreme Court entertained
such a motion which sought to correct, after the lapse of the term, an ad-
judication of that high court because of an alleged erroneous holding of
that court that a bill of exceptions was not filed in time in the particular
case. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was not questioned in that
case, but we must indulge in the presumption that the court concluded it
had jurisdiction or it would not have assumed to pass on the motion."
24 Marble v. Vanhorn (1893), supra footnote 15; Simms v. Thompson,
supra footnote 15; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Sranfill, supra footnote 15; Kings
Lake Drainage District v. Winkelmeyer, supra footnote 15.
25 Gibson v. Pollock (1914) 179 Mo. App. 188, 166 S. W. 875; Davis v.
Robinson (1907) 126 Mo. App. 293, 102 S. W. 1048; Karicofe v. Schwaner
(1917) 196 Mo. App. 572, 196 S. W. 46; G. M. A. C. v. Lyman, supra foot-
note 5; Kings Lake Drainage District v. Winkelmeyer, supra footnote 15.
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the court from rendering the judgment ;20 as when the party was
dead, 27 an infant,2 8 a femme covert29 or a lunatic.30 The discus-
sion thus far may be taken to have established that the writ of
error coram nobis will lie when the court has proceeded in a
case as though a fact which was material to its right to proceed,
existed, when it did not exist, and when the absence of the fact
assumed to exist, entirely defeats the power of the court to
obtain a valid result in its proceeding.31
The use of the expression, errors of fact, in connection with
this writ is too well calculated to produce the impression that
its office may be the correction of errors in conclusions drawn by
the jury, or the court sitting as such, from evidence adduced at
the trial.32 The office of the writ of error coram nobis is to call
attention of the court to, and obtain relief from, errors of fact,
but it does not lie to correct errors of law.33 It is the purpose
28 Hecht-Bro's. Co. v. Walker, supra footnote 15; Norton v. Reed (1920)
281 Mo. 482, 221 S. W. 6; Baker v. Smith's Estate (Mo. App. 1929) 18 S. W.
(2d.) 147; Degener v. Kelly (Mo. App. 1928) 6 S. W. (2d.) 998; Smith v.
Young (1909) 136 Mo. App. 65, 117 S. W. 628.
27 Calloway v. Nifong (1822) 1 Mo. 223; Harkness v. Austin (1865) 36
Mo. 47; State ex rel. Ozark County v. Tate, supra footnote 15; State ex rel.
Potter v. Riley, supra footnote 15; State v. Wallace (1908) 209 Mo. 359,
108 S. W. 542; Dugan v. Scott (1889) 37 Mo. App. 663.
28 Powell v. Gott (1850) 13 Mo. 458, 53 Am. Dec. 153; Randalls v. Wilson
(1856) 24 Mo. 76; Stapp v. Holmes (1871) 48 Mo. 89; Townsend v. Cox
(1870) 45 Mo. 401; State v. Gavner (1860) 30 Mo. 44; Karicofe v. Schwaner
(1917) 196 Mo. App. 572, 196 S. W. 46; Smith v. Young (1909) 136 Mo.
App. 65, 117 S. W. 628; Neenan v. St. Joseph (1894) 126 Mo. 89, 28 S. W.
963; Ex parte Kaufman (1881) 73 Mo. 588; Ex parte Gray (1882) 77 Mo.
160; Ex parte Page (1872) 49 Mo. 291.
29Latshaw v. McNees (1872) 50 Mo. 381; Walker v. Deaver (1883) 79
Mo. 664; Well v. Simmons (1877) 66 Mo. 617.
30 Graves v. Graves (1914) 255 Mo. 468, 164 S. W. 496; Heard v. Sack
(1884) 81 Mo. 610; Gibson v. Pollock (1914) 179 Mo. App. 188, 166 S. W.
874; Baker v. Smith's Estate (Mo. App. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d.) 147.
31G. M. A. C. v. Lyman (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d.) 109; Marble v.
Vanhorn (1893) 53 Mo. App. 361; Kings Lake Drainage District v. Winkel-
meyer (Mo. App. 1933) 62 S. W. (2d.) 1101; Hecht Bro's. Co. v. Walker
(1931) 224 Mo. App. 1156, 35 S. W. (2d.) 372; Simms v. Thompson (1922)
291 Mo. 493, 236 S. W. 876; Norton v. Reed (1920) 281 Mo. 482, 221 S. W.
6; Jeude v. Sims, supra footnote 3.
32 Craig v. Smith (1877) 65 Mo. 536; Weil v. Simmons, supra footnote
29; Graves v. Graves, supra footnote 30; Reed v. Bright (1911) 232 Mo.
399, 134 S. W. 653; State v. Wallace (1908) 209 Mo. 359, 108 S. W. 542;
Hadley v. Bernero (1903) 103 Mo. App. 549, 78 S. W. 64; Le Bourgeoise v.
McNamara (1881) 10 Mo. App. 116, Aff. 82 Mo. 189; Kings Lake Drainage
District v. Winkelmeyer, supra footnote 31.
33Randalls v. Wilson (1856) 24 Mo. 76; State v. Wallace, supra foot-
note 32; Kings Lake Drainage District v. Winkelmeyer, supra footnote 31;
Hecht Bro's. Co. v. Walker (1931) 224 Mo. App. 1156, 35 S. W. (2d.) 372;
Mefford v. Mefford (Mo. App. 1930) 26 S. V. (2d.) 804; Simms v. Thomp-
son (1922) 291 Mo. 493, 236 S. W. 876; Reed v. Bright (1911) 232 Mo. 399,
134 S. W. 653; Audsley v. Hale (1924) 303 Mo. 451, 261 S. W. 117; Smith
v. Young (1909) 136 Mo. App. 65, 117 S. W. 628.
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of the ordinary common-law writ of error to have a judgment
reversed for an erroneous decision on a point of law and runs
from the court of review to the trial court, while the writ of
error oorm nobis lies only in the court where an erroneousjudgment has been rendered in consequence of a mistake of fact
of which the court was not informed.34 In the exercise of ap-
pellate jurisdiction in legal actions superior courts do not try
facts, and relief against an error of fact must necessarily be
obtained in the court where it occurred.3 5 Thus, it is apparent
that the writ of error coram nobis is grounded solely upon latent
errors of fact, which do not appear on the face of the record,
but which must be brought to the attention of the court by evi-
dence aliunde.31 This latent fact authorizing the writ may con-
sist in some matter of process or misprision or fault of the
clerk.'. It is obvious that if the record shows that the alleged
fact was brought to the attention of the court before entry ofjudgment, the purpose of the writ of error coram nobis fails.
When the existence of the fact which is necessary to the juris-
diction of the court has been investigated and determined, then
the matter is res judicata, and a new trial upon that issue may
not be obtained by the writ or motion in the nature of such
writ. s Instead of it being a case reviewable by comm nobis at
84Hirsh v. Weisberger (1891) 44 Mo. App. 507; Norton v. Reed (1920)
281 Mo. 482, 221 S. W. 6; State ex rel. Clarkson (1901) 88 Mo. App. 553;
Marble v. Vanhorn (1893) 53 Mo. App. 361; Heard v. Sack (1884) 81 Mo,
610; Degener v. Kelly (Mo. App. 1928) 6 S. W. (2d.) 998; Fox-Miller
Grain Co. v. Stephans (Mo. App. 1920) 217 S. W. 994; State ex rel. Brown
v. White (1898) 75 Mo. App. 256; Gibson v. Pollock (1914) 179 Mo. App.
188, 166 S. W. 874; Forest Lumber Co. v. Osceola Mining Co. (Mo. 1920)
222 S. W. 398.
35 Forest Lumber Co. v. Osceola Mining Co., supra footnote 34.
36 Groner v. Smith (1872) 49 Mo. 318; Ex parte Page (1872) 49 Mo.
291; Gibson v. Pollock, supra footnote 34; Simms v. Thompson, supra foot-
note 33; Latshaw v. McNees (1872) 50 Mo. 381; Ex parte Kaufman (1881)
73 Mo. 588; Neenan v. St. Joseph, supra footnote 15; State v. Stanley(1909) 225 Mo. 525, 125 S. W. 475; State ex rel. v. Riley (1909) 219 Mo.
667, 118 S. W. 647; State ex rel. v. Heinrich (1883) 14 Mo. App. 146; Dugan
v. Scott (1889) 37 Mo. App. 663; Hirsh v. Weisberger, supra footnote 34;
Simms v. Thompson, supra footnote 33.
37 G. M. A. C. v. Lyman (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d.) 109; Kings Lake
Drainage District v. Winkelmeyer, supra footnote 31. Cf.. Atkinson v.
Atchison R. R. Co. (1883) 81 Mo. 50 (a judgment cannot be set aside at a
term subsequent to that at which it was rendered, on the ground of clerical
mistake or misprision, unless something appears in the record or the judge's
docket, or the clerk's minutes, or papers on file, to show that such mistake
exists, and in what it consists). If the judgment could be corrected by a
nunc pro tune (such as the inadvertence of the clerk) then the complainant
has no standing in court on the basis of a writ coram nobis. It does not lie
to correct matters of record. It would be absurd for a court to issue a
writ of coram nobis to correct the recitations of its own records before it,
showing wherein the entry was incorrect.
.38 Craig v. Smith, supra footnote 32; Weil v. Simmons, supra footnote 29;
Hadley v. Bernero, supra footnote 32; Mefford v. Mefford, supra footnote
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a subsequent term of the court in which the record lies, it is a
case where the court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, pro-
nounced an erroneous conclusion of law on the facts, and is
reviewable only as such 9 To sum up the foregoing, these mo-
tions in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis only go to
errors of judgment occasioned by the absence of some fatal facts,
and not to errors committed with the facts known.
The rule, as usually declared, and in conformity with the
above, is that on a writ of error coram nobis, only such errors
of fact can be assigned as are consistent with the record before
the court in which the case was tried.40 The error of fact charged
cannot be used to falsify the record, nor to put in issue adjudi-
cated facts, nor to retry the case on the merits.41 The court will
not, under any circumstances, look into the cause of action on
which the judgment was rendered. 42 An averment of fact which
contradicts the recital of the record itself cannot be heard in
a motion in the nature of a writ of error cora'm nobiS.4 3 Where
33; Norton v. Reed, supra footnoteK 31; Callicotte v. C. R. I. R. R. (Mo.
Sup. 1918) 204 S. W. 528; Warren v. Railway Conductors (1918) 199 Mo.
App. 200, 201 S. W. 368; Marble v. Vanhorn, supra footnote 34.
39 Forest Lumber Co. v. Osceola Mining Co. (Mo. 1920) 222 S. W. 398;
Mefford v. Mefford, supra footnote 33; Audsley v. Hale, supra footnote
(1924) 303 Mo. 451, 261 S. W. 117; Jeude v. Sims, supra footnote 3; Cross
v. Gould, supra footnote 4; Smith v. Young (1909) 136 Mo. App. 65, 117
S. W. 628; Graves v. Graves, supra footnote 30; Simms v. Thompson,
supra footnote 31.
40 G. M. A. C. v. Lyman (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d.) 109 (the use of
the writ of error coram nobis to show that the court assumed a fact essen-
tial to its right to proceed in assuming that notice appeal had been given
to defendant through an alleged agent was allowed by the court. The
recital that defendant was duly served was declared not essential to the
validity of the judgment. The writ cannot be used to attack the verity of
the recitals in the judgment essential to its validity) ; State ex rel. Brown
v. White (1898) 75 Mo. App. 256; State ex rel. Wheat v. Horine (1895)
63 Mo. App. 1; Ragland v. Ragland (Mo. App. 1924) 258 S. W. 728;
Schneider v. Schneider (Mo. App. 1925) 273 S. W. 1081; Reed v. Bright,
supra footnote 15; Hirsh v. Weisberger (1891) 44 Mo. App. 507; Kings
Lake Drainage District v. Winkelmeyer (Mo. App. 1933) 62 S. W. (2d.)
1101 (motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis charging that the
court in assessing benefits against land was misled as to the number of
acres of land. The court denied the relief on appeal and in so holding held
that only such errors can be assigned as are consistent with the record
before the court, and the court will not look into the cause of action on
which the judgment was rendered); Hecht Bro's. Co. v. Walker, supra foot-
note 33; State v. Stanley (1909) 225 Mo. 525, 125 S. W. 475; State ex rel.
v. Riley (1909) 219 Mo. 667, 118 S. W. 647.41 11artman v. Hartman (1911) 154 Mo. App. 243, 133 S. W. 669; State
v. Wallace (1908) 209 Mo. 359, 108 S. W. 542; Kings Lake Drainage Dis-
trict v. Winkelmeyer, supra footnote 40; Jeude v. Sims, supra footnote 3;
Cross v. Gould, supra footnote 4.
42 Supra, footnotes 40, 41.
43 Ex parte Page (1872) 49 Mo. 291; Weil v. Simmons (1877) 66 Mo.
617; State ex rel. v. Riley, supra footnote 15.
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an infant, for example, is sued, there is nothing to enable the
court to see that he is an infant when the fact of his majority
is assumed. The law considers that, as an infant, he has no
discretion to choose an attorney, and therefore will not let him
appear by attorney, but requires the court to appoint a fit person
his guardian to make defense for him. If the plaintiff does not
make known the fact of the defendant's infancy so as to allow
the court to decide against a person under disability and allow
the full defense which the law intends, the plaintiff's judgment
may be reversed, so as to let in the other party to defend with
all the advantages to which the law entitled him; and therefore
the defendant may aver the fact of his disability, which in no
way contradicts the record, in order that he may have the benefit
of legal defense.44 Similar reasons accounted for the decisions
where a femme covert was sued without her husband.4 5
It is not to be understood that every error of fact warrants
the setting aside of a judgment by a writ of error coram nobis.
If it be true that error was committed, it nevertheless must ap-
pear that such error is one materially affecting the merits of the
controversy"6 and not mere extraneous matters.47 It should be
an issue in the case, and an issue out of which an error of fact
can arise, which would authorize a writ of error coram nobi. 48
Proceedings by writ of error coran nobis are not exempt from
the general rule that relief may be denied to a party because of
his own negligence or laches.49 It seems to be well settled that
44 Powell v. Gott, supra footnote 28; Randalls v. Wilson, supra footnote
33; State v. Govner, supra footnote 28; Townsend v. Cox, supra footnote
28; Smith v. Young, supra footnote 28; Karicofe v. Schwaner, supra foot-
note 28; Neenan v. St. Joseph, supra footnote 28; Ex parte Kaufman, supra
footnote 28; Ex parte Gray, supra footnote 28; Ex parte Page, supra foot-
note 28.
45 Latshaw v. McNees, supra footnote 29; Weil v. Simmons, supra foot-
note 29; Walker v. Deaver, supra footnote 29; Jeude v. Sims, supra foot-
note 3 (pointing out this to be true before the Married Womans Act).
46 Simms v. Thompson, supra footnote 33 (whether unknown defendants
are or are not residents of the state is, under the statute, wholly immaterial
and a fact unnecessary to be stated as regards judgment for delinquent
taxes against land. Their residence or non-residence was not a fact which
was material to the right of the court to render the judgment, nor could it
have any influence on the court's action in the premises); State ex rel. v.
Clarkson, supra footnote (1901) 88 Mo. App. 553; G. M. A. C. v. Lyman.
supra footnote 40; Hecht Bro's. Co. v. Walker, supra footnote 33.
47 This oft asserted proposition becomes very important in the connection
of fraud as a basis for the writ of error coram nobis and will be considered
later. Schneider v. Schneider (Mo. App. 1925) 273 S. W. 1081; Fisher v.
Fisher (1904) 114 Mo. App. 627, 90 S. W. 413; Ragland v. Ragland (Mo.
App. 1924) 258 S. W. 728; Graf v. Dougherty (1909) 139 Mo. App. 56,
120 S. W. 661; Simms v. Thompson, supra footnote 31.
48 Smith v. Young supra footnote 33; Sowers-Taylor Co. v. Collins (Mo.
App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d.) 692; See further footnote 46, supra.
49 Hadley v. Bernero (1903) 103 Mo. App. 549, 78 S. W. 64; Hecht Bro's.
Co. v. Walker, supra footnote 33; Jeude v. Sims, supra footnote 3; Cross v.
Gould, supra footnote 4; Norton v. Reed, (1920) 281 Mo. 482, 221 S. W. 16;
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the writ cannot reach matters of fact known by the complaining
party at or before the time of trial, or which by reasonable dili-
gence he should have known, or which he overlooked due to
negligence. 50 Consequently, if he knew of the alleged error of
fact at the time the judgment was entered and did not avail him-
self of it he may be precluded from subsequent proceeding for
relief. Thus, when a complaining party seeks relief from a judg-
ment on the ground that it was taken against him by default,
and that he had a meritorious defense to the action, he may be
met by the claim that it was his own negligence which caused
the judgment to be entered against him, and that it was so in-
excusable that he was not entitled to relief."
LIMITATION
We now come to a phase of the problem concerned with the
limitation upon the application for a writ of error coram nobis.
It might legitimately be urged that the motion to set aside a
judgment in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis, is subject
to the same restrictions in point of time as a motion for irregu-
larity, and must be made within three years from the rendition
of the judgment.5 2 It might also be urged that a court has no
power to vacate a judgment on the grounds of a writ of error
coram nobis after the term at which it was rendered;5;3 or at
least that the motion to vacate be made within a reasonable time
after the entry of the judgment." Nevertheless, it has been
asserted many times that there is no limitation to be found in
our statute book to a writ of error coram nobis. It has become
well settled by constantly repeated statements that no statute of
limitations applies to the writ of error coram nobis."i
Marble v. Vanhorn (1893) 53 Mo. App. 361; Bruner v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.
(Mo. App. 1921) 233 S. W. 256.
50 State ex rel. Orr v. Latshaw (1922) 291 Mo. 592, 237 S. W. 770; Reed
v. Bright (1911) 232 Mo. 399, 134 S. W. 653; Hadley v. Bernero, supra
footnote 49; Kings Lake Drainage District v. Winkelmeyer, supra footnote
40.
-'Townsend v. Cox (1870) 45 Mo. 401; Degener v. Kelly (Mo. App.
1928) 6 S. W. (2d.) 998; State ex rel. Orr v. Latshaw, supra footnote 50;
Davis v. Robinson (1907) 126 Mo. App. 293, 102 S. W. 1048; Marble v.
Vanhorn, supra footnote 49; Reed v. Bright, supra footnote 50.
52Downing v. Still (1869) 43 Mo. 309 (In general, a court will not correct
or set aside its judgment except at the term at which they were rendered,
but under statute, a judgment may be set aside for irregularity at any
subsequent term within three years after its rendition).
53 Orirs v. Elliott (1896) 65 Mo. App. 96.
S4Alexander v. Hadson (1830) 2 Mo. 228; Powell v. Gott (1850) 13 Mo.
458, 53 Am. Dec. 153.
55Powell v. Gott, supra footnote 54; Gibson v. Pollock (1914) 179 Mo.
App. 188, 166 S. W. 874; Heard v. Sack (1884) 81 Mo. 610; Hirsh v. Weis-
berger (1891) 44 Mo. App. 507; State ex rel. Hudson v. Heinrich (1883)
14 Mo. App. 146; State v. Wallace (1908) 209 Mo. 359, 108 S. W. 542;
Groner v. Smith (1872) 49 Mo. 318; Townsend v. Cox (1870) 45 Mo. 401.
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PROCEDURE
In light of the preceding discussion it is clear that in Missouri,
a motion to vacate a judgment for error of fact, and not for
patent errors of record, supported by evidence dehors the record,
takes the place of the common-law writ of error coram nobis. 56
The motion is in the nature of an independent and direct attack
upon the judgment of the court committing the error.5 7 This
motion which serves the purpose of the common-law writ of
error coram nobis, is in the nature of a pleading s It need not
appear in the bill of exceptions, but properly appears in the
record proper.,5 Issues must be made up under the writ, and
these must be tried, if necessary, by a jury ;6 but the writ does
not open up the entire case, but only those points or questions
raised by the application for it.61
Since the motion is considered an independent action, and need
not be incorporated in a bill of exception so as to make it part
of the record, it is asserted to be in the nature of a new action,
analogous to the writ of error.62 It depends necessarily upon the
production of extrinsic evidence, for the error of fact does not
appear on the record as in the case where the remedy is the
ordinary writ of error. 3 There must be a trial of an issue of
fact; and if this trial results in depriving the plaintiff of the
judgment, which he has recovered and which appears to be regu-
lar on its face, he may at once prosecute an appeal or writ of
error for a reversal. 64
56 Walker v. Deaver (1883) 79 Mo. 664; Groner v. Smith, supra footnote
55; State ex rel. v. Riley, supra footnote 36; Gibson v. Pollock (1914) 179
Mo. App. 188, 166 S. W. 874; Norton v. Reed, supra footnote 49; Fox-
Miller Grain Co. v. Stephans, supra footnote 34; Karicofe v. Schwaner
(1917) 196 Mo. App. 572, 196 S. W. 46.
57 Metal Workers v. Mercantile Co. (1926) 218 Mo. App. 544, 280 S. W.
82; Audsley v. Hale (1924) 303 Mo. 451, 261 S. W. 117; Scott v. Rees (1923)
300 Mo. 123, 253 S. W. 998; State ex rel. v. Riley, supra footnote 36.
5 Sowers-Taylor Co. v. Collins, supra footnote 48; Scott v. Rees, supra
footnote 57.
59 Hirsh v. Weisberger, supra footnote 55; Jeude v. Sims, supra footnote
3; Simms v. Thompson, supra footnote 33; Cross v. Gould, supra footnote 4.
60 G. M. A. C. v. Lyman (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d.) 109; Simms v.
Thompson, supra footnote 33.
61 Gibson v. Pollock, supra footnote 56; Reed v. Bright, supra footnote
32; Marble v. Vanhorn, supra footnote 34.
62 Sowers-Taylor Co. v. Collins, supra footnote 48; Scott v. Rees, supra
footnote 57; Hirsh v. Weisberger, supra footnote 55; Fox-Miller Grain Co.
v. Stephans, supra footnote 34; Simms v. Thompson, supra footnote 33;
Baker v. Smith's Estate (Mo. App. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d.) 147.
6 State ex rel. v. Horine (1895) 63 Mo. App. 1; Hirsh v. Weisberger,
supra footnote 55; Hartman v. Hartman (1911) 154 Mo. App. 243, 133
S. W. 669; Gibson v. Pollock, supra footnote 56.
64 Metal Workers v. Mercantile Co. (1926) 218 Mo. App. 544, 280 S. W.
82; Audsley v. Hale 57; State ex rel. v. Riley, supra footnote 36; Scott v.
Rees, supra footnote 57; Shuck v. Lawton (1913) 249 Mo. 168, 155 S. W. 20.
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The writ of error coram nobis is not a writ of right in the
sense that it will issue on a mere demand for it.65 An affirmative
showing must be made either by affidavit or verified petition,
and from such showing, and not from a mere demand for the
writ, the court will determine whether it shall issue."0 The cases
recognize that the court to which application is made for the
writ has a discretion to deny it.67 Where, in the application
for such a motion, the evidence going to establish the error of
fact is conflicting, an appellate court will not interfere with the
discretion of the trial court in refusing to vacate the judgment. 8
But if the evidence is all on one side and uncontradicted, the
appellate court will interfere, on the ground that such discretion
has been abused.69
APPLICATION IN PRACTICE
The first case in the Missouri reports discussing the applica-
tion of the writ of error coram nobis is that of Calloway v.
Nifong.70 Calloway brought writ of error to the Supreme Court
to reverse a judgment and assigned as error in fact, that his
co-defendant died after service but before the judgment was
rendered. The court dismissed the writ of error and held that,
according to the established course of the common law, error in
fact could only be corrected in the court where it occurred, or in
which the record was. In this case, the court said the remedy
must be by writ of error coram nobis in the circuit court, the
record being in that court. When a defendant dies after service
upon him and before judgment, writ of error corcm nobis is a
proper remedy to set aside and vacate the judgment, for the
reason that it is an error of fact not appearing on the record of
the court which renders the judgment invalid.71 Where a slave
pleaded guilty to a charge of grand larceny as a free man and
was sentenced to the penitentiary, which sentence was incom-
petent by reason of the fact of slavery, it was held that the court
should set aside the judgment on writ of error coram nobis at
a subsequent term.7 2 And so, too, where an infant, upon a plea
65 Stupp v. Holmes (1871) 48 Mo. 89; State v. Wallace (1908) 209 Mo.
359, 108 S. W. 542; Latshaw v. McNees (1872) 50 Mo. 381.
66Ex parte Gray (1882) 77 Mo. 160; State ex rel. v. Riley, supra foot-
note 36; Estes v. Nell (1901) 163 Mo. 157, 63 S. W. 724; Neenan v. St.
Joseph (1894) 126 Mo. 89, S. W. 963. See footnote 65, supra.
67 State v. Wallace, supra footnote 65.
68Ibid. State ex rel. v. Heinrich (1883) 14 Mo. App. 146; Craig v.
Smith (1877) 65 Mo. 536.
69 Ibid.
70 (1822) 1 Mo. 223.
71Harlmess v. Austin (1865) 36 Mo. 47; State v. Wallace (1908) 209
Mo. 359, 108 S. W. 542; State ex rel. v. Riley (1909) 219 Mo. 667, 118 S. W.
647; Dugan v. Scott (1889) 37 Mo. App. 663; State ex rel. Ozark County
v. Tate (1892) 109 Mo. 265, 18 S. W. 1088.
72 Ex parte Toney (1848) 11 Mo. 661.
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of guilty, was sentenced to the penitentiary which was an in-
competent judgment on account of the fact of his infancy, the
court, at a subsequent term, set the judgment aside on a writ of
error coram nobis and committed him to jail.73 Where a judg-
ment was rendered against an infant without a guardian ad
litem as though he were sui juris, which judgment was incom-
petent because of the fact of infancy, it was adjudged proper to
set the same aside at a subsequent term on writ of error coram
nobis.74 In cases where judgment had been given against an in-
sane person, without the intervention of a guardian, as though
sane, it was held to be such an error of fact not appearing on
the record as essentially invalidating the proceeding, and the
judgment was therefore set aside on writ of error eoram nobis.75
Where a married woman (before the Married Woman's Act) was
sued without her husband being joined and judgment obtained
against her, it was adjudged proper to set aside the judgment
at a subsequent term on a motion in the nature of a writ of error
coram nobis.76 Where it appeared affirmatively by the sheriff's
return that one defendant was not served, and, through error,
counsel representing the other defendants answered as though
they represented the one unserved with the others, it was held
that a writ of error coram nobis (application for by motion)
filed at a subsequent term was the proper remedy to set aside the
judgment.77
A ground of quite frequent action by the courts is that the
judgment has been given against a party because of the un-
authorized appearance of an attorney claiming to represent him.73
In Norton v. Reed,'79 the action was in ejectment, in which a
stipulation had been filed that it should abide a decision of the
Supreme Court in another case. After the decision of that court
73 State v. Gavner (1860) 30 Mo. 44; Ex parte Kaufman (1881) 73 Mo.
588; Ex parte Gray (1882) 77 Mo. 160.
74 Powell v. Gott (1850) 13 Mo. 458, 53 Am. Dec. 153; Randalls v. Wilson
(1856) 24 Mo. 76; Townsend v. Cox (1870) 45 Mo. 401; Stupp v. Holmes
(1871) 48 Mo. 89; Ex parte Gray, supra footnote 73; Ex parte Kaufman,
supra footnote 73; Ex parte Page (1872) 49 Mo. 291; State v. Gavner,
supra footnote 73; Neenan v. St. Joseph, supra footnote 66; Karicofe v.
Schwaner (1917) 196 Mo. App. 572, 196 S. W. 46; Smith v. Young (1909)
136 Mo. App. 65, 117 S. W. 628.
75 Gaves v. Graves (1914) 255 Mo. 468, 164 S. W. 496; Heard v. Sack
(1884) 81 Mo. 610; Gibson v. Pollock (1914) 179 Mo. App. 188, 166 S. W.
874; Baker v. Smith's Estate (Mo. App. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d.) 147.
76 Latshaw v. McNees, supra footnote 29; Wel v. Simmons, supra foot-
note 29; Walker v. Deaver, supra footnote 29.
TT Craig v. Smith (1877) 65 Mo. 536.
78 Craig v. Smith, supra footnote 77; Bradley v. Welsh (1890) 100 Mo.
258, 12 S. W. 911; Norton v. Reed (1920) 281 Mo. 482, 221 S. W. 6; Hecht-
Bro's. Co. v. Walker (1931) 224 Mo. App. 1156, 35 S. W. (2d.) 372; G. M.
A. C. v. Lyman (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d.) 109.
79 Supra, footnote 78.
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in such other case, plaintiffs sold all of their interest in the sub-ject-matter of the action to the defendant Reed, who, in turn,
conveyed the same to Johnson. Thereafter, an order was en-
tered of record in the case, reciting that it was dismissed by the
plaintiffs. Johnson filed a motion in the nature of a writ of error
cor m nobis setting out the above facts, and avering that the
order of dismissal was erroneously made, and praying that the
same be set aside and judgment rendered upon the stipulation
referred to. Johnson testified he was not represented by any
attorney, was not consulted, and did not consent to, or partici-
pate in, the order of dismissal and did not authorize any one to
dismiss it. The court said: "The motion before us contains all
the facts necessary to constitute it a writ of error coram nobis.
It points out a mistake made by the court, without the fault of
the appellants, based upon a misapprehension of the actual facts,
which, if known to the court at the time, would have precluded
it from dismissing the cause." A recent case very much in point
is that of Hecht Bro's. Co. v. Walker.80 In this case a judgment
had been rendered against a dissolved corporation on injunction
bonds without notice to its successor or to the court of the fact
of the succession. The corporation, which assumed the liabilities
of the dissolved corporation, was allowed to set aside the judg-
ment by writ of error coam nobis. A more recent case is one
of the present year in which the Kansas City Court of Appeals
allowed evidence under the writ to show that notice of an appeal
had been given to an alleged agent, who was in fact unauthor-
ized to act for the defendant at any time.8' To the contention
that the writ could not be used to attack the verity of recitals in
the judgment essential to its validity, the court answered that
the statement to the effect that the defendant had been duly
notified was not essential to the validity of the judgment. The
court then proceeded to establish that the lack of notice was an
error of fact material to the right of the court to proceed and
that the absence of the fact assumed to exist, entirely defeated
the power of the court to attain a valid result in its proceeding8la
The above instances illustrate the doctrine. Its application was
considered entirely appropriate in every case cited. It will be
noted that in each case the judgment was incompetent for some
error of fact when the fact about which the error was committed
was one essential to the validity of the proceeding, and had been
treated by the court as existing when in truth it did not.
Any discussion of a current laws topic which does not deplore
a current "confusion of authority" is perhaps a rarity. It is not
the purpose of the writer to attempt an exhaustive treatise or
80 (1931) 224 Mo. App. 1156, 35 S. W. (2d.) 372.
81 G. M. A. C. v. Lyman, supra footnote 78.
81a Ibid.
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to analyze or account for the origin or continuance of any in-
stances of what might be termed "confusion of authority" except
insofar as references may help to more clearly mark the separate
office of the writ of error coram nobis. The wealth of cases cited
may be consulted with profit in illustrating the guarded limits
surrounding the motions in the nature of writes of error coram
nobis and one based on the irregularities patent of record. At
this point we come to a brief consideration of the latter motion.
MOTION FOR IRREGULARITIES
It was pointed out earlier that Missouri, by statute, adopted
the common law of England, prior to the fourth year of the reign
of James the First, as the rule of decision. 82 The motion for ir-
regularities was and is now a well-known common law remedy,
by which system of jurisprudence it should usually, but not al-
ways, be filed at the term at which the judgment sought to be
vacated was rendered.8 ' There is a Missouri statute under which
this relief has been granted in many cases reading: "Judgments
in any court of record shall not be set aside for irregularity on
motion, unless such motion be made within three years after
the term at which such judgment was rendered. '84 The observa-
tion of Justice Nortoni is very apposite in relation to this point
when he states that our statute on the subject does no more than
recognize this as a pre-existing common-law remedy, and, by im-
plication, authorizes its continuance, limiting its application,
however, to cases where the motion is filed "within three years
after the term at which such judgment was rendered. '85
It may be urged legitimately that such section, in words, does
not grant a power but puts a limitation on a power assumed to
exist. This position seems very plausible and yet it has been ably
asserted that the rule has been to allow it as a source of judicial
power, and that it has uniformly been applied in that way. 6 It
is important to observe that the statute employs the word "ir-
regularity." The scope of the power of the court under that sec-
tion would seem to turn on that word. What is an irregularity
in the legal sense? A standard treatise defines it thus: "An ir-
regularity may be defined to be the want of adherence to some
prescribed rule or mode of proceeding; and it consists, either in
82 Supra, footnote 14.
93 Tidd's Prac., 512.
84 R. S. Mo. (1929), section 1101.
85 Cross v. Gould (1908) 131 Mo. App. 585, 110 S. W. 672. The limita-
tion of the time in which the motion might be filed was originally five years.
R. S. Mo. (1835), p. 328, section 1; R. S. Mo. (1845), p. 831, section 8.
The present three year period was embodied in the G. S. (1866), p. 686,
section 26, and continued up to the present without change.
9'Jeude v. Sims (1914) 258 Mo. 26, 166 S. W. 1048. See opinion of
Lamm, C. J. (dissenting).
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omitting to do something that is necessary for the due and
orderly conducting of a suit, or doing it in an unseasonable time
or improper manner."' 8 7 Conceding the correctness and adequacy
of the definition, it speaks the language of the Missouri courts
and is to be found, in substance, in practically all of the cases s8
It has been ruled over and over again that the irregularity
reached by the motion under the statute must be one patent on
the record, and not resting in proof dehors the record.89 The
irregularity in the mind of the law-maker is distinguished by
the courts from mere "error."90 And, while the irregularity need
not be one which would render the judgment absolutely void, and
therefore subject to be defeated by collateral attack, it must be
one which indicates at least that the judgment was given con-
trary, in some material respect, to the established form and
modes of procedure for the orderly administration of justice. 1
Illustrative of such irregularities as will authorize the vacation
of a judgment, an instance appearing frequently in the books is
where a judgment was rendered in service by publication based
on an allegation of non-residence when none such exists.2  Also,
where a default judgment was taken prematurely as shown by
the record . 3 So, too, where both final and interlocutory judg-
ments by default taken at the same term in a suit not founded
upon a bill, bond, or note for the direct payment of money were
determined to be irregularities which authorized the court to set
aside the judgment at a subsequent term.94 In the case of Stacker
871 Tidd Prac. (3rd. Am. Ed.) 512.
88 Branstetter v. Rives (1864) 34 Mo. 318; Jeude v. Sims, supra footnote
86; Downing v. Still (1869) 43 Mo. 309; Scott v. Rees (1923) 300 Mo. 123,
253 S. W. 998; Le Bourgeoise v. McNamara (1881) 10 Mo. App. 116, Aff.
82 Mo. 189; Cross v. Gould, supra footnote 4.
89 Shuck v. Lawton (1913) 249 Mo. 168, 155 S. W. 20; Nelson v. Brown
(1856) 23 Mo. 13; Downing v. Still, supra footnote 88; Wel v. Simmons
(1877) 66 Mo. 617; State v. Stanley (1909) 225 Mo. 525, 125 S. W. 475;
Sowers-Taylor Co. v. Collins (Mo. App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d.) 692; Hirsh v.
Weisberger (1891) 44 Mo. App. 507; Marble v. Vanhorn (1893) 53 Mo.
App. 361; State ex rel. v. Riley (1909) 219 Mo. 667, 118 S. W. 647; Cross
v. Gould, supra footnote 4.90 Jeude v. Sims, supra footnote 86; Ex parte Toney (1848) 11 Mo. 661;
State ex rel. v. Tate (1892) 109 Mo. 265, 18 S. W. 1088; Marble v. Vanhorn,
supra footnote 89; Smith v. Young (1909) 136 Mo. App. 65, 117 S. W. 628.
91 Cross v. Gould, supra footnote 4; Nave v. Todd (1884) 83 Mo. 601;
Harbor v. Pac. R. R. (1862) 32 Mo. 423; Lawther v. Agee (1864) 34 Mo.
372; Branstetter v. Rives, supra footnote 88; Stacker v. Cooper Circuit
Court (1857) 25 Mo. 401.
92 Shuck v. Lawton, supra footnote 89; State ex rel. v. Heinrich (1883)
14 Mo. App. 146; Simms v. Thompson (1922) 291 Mo. 493, 236 S. W. 876;
State ex rel. v. Clarkson (1901) 88 Mo. App. 553.
93Branstetter v. Rives, supra footnote 88; Reed Bro's. v. Nicholson
(1902) 93 Mo. App. 29; Smith v. Best (1868) 42 Mo. 185.
94 Lawther v. Agee, supra footnote 91.
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v. Cooper Circuit Court,95 a cause was referred, the referee failed
to report for a considerable time after the report was due.
During the interim, the appellee induced the court to affirm the
judgment of the justice. At a subsequent term the court set aside
this judgment of affirmance for irregularity, and this action was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. If a judgment be taken exceed-
ing the amount prayed for in the petition, that would be an irreg-
ularity under the statute.'" Similarly, the rendering of a judg-
ment for an amount in excess of the penal provisions of a bond
in suit is an irregularity for which the judgment may be set
aside on motion at a subsequent term.9 7 A judgment entered on
the merits by default while a demurrer or answer were on file
and not disposed of has been determined to be an irregularity for
which the judgment should be set aside at a subsequent term. 8
It will be noted here that in all of these cases referred to above,
the irregularity appeared on the face of the proceeding, and was
not discoverable without evidence aliunde or dehors the record.
The distinctions between the proceeding by motion to vacate
for irregularities and the motion in the nature of a writ of error
coram nobis is marked but have not always been observed. The
former is grounded solely on irregularities of procedure which
appear on the face of the record;99 the latter is grounded solely
upon latent errors of fact, which do not appear on the face of
the record, but which must be brought to the attention of the
court by evidence aliunde.1°o The former is subject, by the terms
of the statute, to a limitation of three years;"'0 the latter is not
subject to any distinct statute of limitations.10 2
Another basis for distinguishing the two has been advanced
with the argument that the motion to vacate a judgment for
irregularities is a motion in the original suit, and not a separate
95 (1857) 25 Mo. 401.
96Chambers v. Carthel (1865) 35 Mo. 374.
97 Showles v. Freeman (1884) 81 Mo. 540.
98 Norman v. Hooker (1865) 35 Mo. 366.
9 It has been determined in numerous cases, of which Harbor v. Pac.
R. R. indicates that class that, however, erroneous a proceeding may be, if
it be regular, after the manner of the prescribed methods and modes of
procedure, the judgment will not be set aside at a subsequent term on
motion as for irregularities. Harbor v. Pac. R. R. (1862) 32 Mo. 423. See
also in this connection Phillips v. Evans (1876) 64 Mo. 17; Hefferman v.
Ragsdale (1906) 199 Mo. 375, 97 S. W. 890, where it is pointed out the
irregularity must appear on the face of the proceeding, and that it is not
permissible to investigate from evidence aliunde or dehors the record.
0o Gibson v. Pollock (1914) 179 Mo. App. 188, 166 S. W. 874; Scott v.
Rees (1923) 300 Mo. 123, 253 S. W. 998; Norton v. Reed (1920) 281 Mo.
482, 221 S. W. 6; Dugan v. Scott (1889) 37 Mo. App. 663; State v. Stanley
(1909) 225 Mo. 525, 125 S. W. 475; Heard v. Sack (1884) 81 Mo. 610;
Ex parte Toney (1848) 11 Mo. 661.
1 Supra, footnote 84.
102 Supra, footnote 55.
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action.10 3 Accordingly, neither an appeal nor writ of error lie
from an order sustaining the motion and reinstating the cause
on the docket; but the remedy of the other party is to take a bill
of exceptions, proceed no further in the cause, suffer final judg-
ment to go against him, and then prosecute his appeal or writ
of error. 0 4 The order of the court is thus not considered a final
judgment or order from which an appeal lies.1° ' It has been said,
however, that the motion in the nature of a writ of error coram
nobis is in the nature of a new action, analagous to a writ of
error.10 6 The motion is in the nature of a pleading and does not
have to be preserved by a bill of exceptions, the proceeding being
entirely independent of the original trial. 0 7 For this reason the
Kansas City Court of Appeals in the case of Robinson v. Henry, °8
and Sowers-Taylor Co. v. Collins,'" refused to review the action
of a trial court in sustaining or overruling a motion for irregu-
larities unless the motion was incorporated in a bill of exceptions.
The court in the Sowers-Taylor Co. v. Collins case while refusing
to review any action of the trial court in ruling upon the attacks
upon the face of the record, went on to state that a motion to
vacate a judgment for error of fact, which must be supported by
evidence dehors the record, and which serves the purpose of the
common-law writ of error coram nobis, is in the nature of a
pleading and need not appear in the bill of exceptions.
On the other hand, the St. Louis Court of Appeals, in the case
1o3 Hirsh v. Weisberger (1891) 44 Mo. App. 507.
1,04 Ibid. Robinson v. Henry (Mo. App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d.) 693; Sowers-
Taylor Co. v. Collins (Mo. App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d.) 692; Daggs v. Smith
(1905) 193 Mo. 494, 91 S. W. 1043; Clarkson v. Stanchfield (1874) 57 Mo.
573; Choteau v. Nuckols (1862) 33 Mo. 148; Loudon v. King (1856) 22 Mo.
336.
'Or Ibid.
106 State ex rel. v. Riley (1909) 225 Mo. 525, 125 S. W. 475 (In this
state a motion to vacate a judgment for error of fact, and not for patent
error of record, supported by evidence dehors the record, takes the place of
the common-law writ of error coram nobis and is in the nature of an inde-
pendent and direct attack upon the judgment in the court committing the
error. A judgment upon such a motion is within itself a final judgment,
from which an appeal will lie); Hirsh v. Weisberger, supra footnote 103
(the writ of error coram nobis is in the nature of a new action, analogous to
the writ of error. It necessarily depends upon the production of extrinsic
evidence, for the error does not appear on the record as in the case where
the remedy is the ordinary writ of error. There must be a trial of an issue
of fact; and if the trial results in depriving the plaintiff of the judgment,
which he has recovered and which appears to be regular on its face, it may
be assumed that he may at once prosecute an appeal or writ of error to
reverse the order); Baker v. Smith's Estate (Mo. App. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d.)
147; Jeude v. Sims, supra footnote 3; Cross v. Gould, supra footnote 4.
107 Scott v. Rees (1923) 300 Mo. 123, 253 S. W. 998; Simms v. Thomp-
son (1922) 291 Mo. 493, 236 S. W. 876; Norton v. Reed, supra footnote 100.
10s (Mo. App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d.) 693.
109 (Mo. App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d.) 692.
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of Metal Workers v. Mercantile Company"0 held that a motion
to vacate a judgment filed after a term at which the judgment
was rendered, whether for irregularities on the face of the record
or for matters dehors the record, is in the nature of an inde-
pendent proceeding, and that the order made by the court upon
such motion is an order from which an appeal or writ of error
lies. This ruling applies to motions filed under the statute and
to motions which are in the nature of writs of error coram
nobis."1' This is the view taken by the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri.112
To insist that the motion against irregularities should be pre-
served in a bill of exceptions would seem to be an idle argument.
It matters not whether the motion is preserved in the bill of
exceptions. The record proper is available. While the general
rule is that a bill of exceptions is the proper receptacle for ordi-
nary motions, there are exceptions to this rule.- 3 One of them
is that motions which, when served, have the office of due process
of law, or are in the nature of original and independent proceed-
ings, though grafted on the main stem of the original suit, are in
effect pleadings, become part of the record proper, and come up
without a bill. 14 There would seem to be no difference between
the two motions in this respect. An appeal is a creature of
statute only. Now, by R. S. Mo. (1929), section 1018, an appeal
is allowed "from any final judgment in the case, or from any
special order after final judgment in the cause." Either type of
motion, in substance, is a new suit. From that standpoint,
broadly speaking, the vacating judgment is a "final judgment"
and an appeal lies by virtue of the statute. But, if the proceed-
ing to vacate be held not to be a new suit, yet the statute still
allows an appeal because, on such view, the vacating judgment
or order may be allowed to fall into the class of any "special
order after final judgment in the cause." The ruling on a motion
for irregularities and the motion in the nature of a writ of error
coram nobis is a special order made after final judgment in a
110 (1926) 218 Mo. App. 544, 280 S. W. 82.
AI Audsley v. Hale (1924) 303 Mo. 451, 261 S. W. 117; State ex rel. v.
Riley, supra footnote 107; Scott v. Rees, supra footnote 108; Schuck v. Law-
ton, supra footnote 89. See also Osage Inv. Co. v. Siguist (1922) 298 Mo.
139, 250 S. W. 39; Bussiere's Adm'r. v. Say-man (1913) 257 Mo. 303, 165
S. W. 796.
"'1 Audsley v. Hale, supra footnote 111; Scott v. Rees, supra footnote 8
(both the motion for irregularities and the motion in the nature of a writ
of error coram nobis are direct attacks upon the judgment rendered, and
it would seem that the motion in each case performs the same function
or office).
113Jeude v. Sims (1914) 258 Mo. 42, 166 S. W. 1048; Simms v. Thompson
supra footnote 107; Sowers-Taylor Co. v. Collins, supra footnote 104;
Robinson v. Henry, supra footnote 104.
114 Jeude v. Sims, supra footnote 113.
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case from which an appeal will lie and it is a final judgment or
decision to which a writ of error will run.
We now come to the question of the form of remedy applicable
when there has been judgment rendered against a defendant by
publication when, in fact, he was within the jurisdiction of the
court rendering the judgment or in fact a resident of the state.
In State ex rel. v. Heinrickh1' a motion was filed to vacate a judg-
ment rendered against the defendant for delinquent taxes on an
order of publication as a non-resident when in fact he lived in
the county in which the judgment was rendered. The motion
while considered as in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis,
was in fact filed within three years after the rendition of thejudgment and a reopening of the case was authorized under the
statute providing for a review of the judgment within three
years after its rendition. 16 In Y eenan v. St. Joseph,,T the case
was complicated by the additional fact that not only was the
defendant not served with process but was a minor. The judg-
ment for the sale of the land for the delinquent taxes was set
aside, the court being firmly of the opinion that the case offered
a proper instance for the application of the writ of error coram
nobis. The case of State ex rel. v. Hoyine"1 was another instance
where a tax judgment was vacated for the reason that service
was had by publication when in fact the defendants were resi-
dents of the state. The proceeding was termed a motion in the
nature of a writ of error corm nobis and, as such, it was per-
mitted to set aside the judgment entered against a party in con-
sequence of the error of fact which did not appear of record.
Recitals of fact in an order of publication in tax suits were sub-ject to contradiction by evidence dehors the record by the writ
of error coram nobis. The jurisdiction to render the judgment
depended upon constructive service had upon the erroneous find-
ing of a fact necessary to sustain such service. Following this
case was State ex rel. Brown v. White, 11 where the judgment for
taxes was set aside on the ground that service was obtained by
publication when the defendant was iii fact a resident of the
state. The court, in reversing the lower court, held that an error
of fact had been committed and one, too, concerning a matter
vital to its jurisdiction, and which error did not appear on the
face of the record in the tax suit. The writ of error coram nobis
was declared to be the proper proceeding to reach this error of
115 (1883) 14 Mo. App. 146.
-6 See footnote 7, supra. Randolph v. Sloan (1874) 58 Mo. 155 (motion
to set aside a judgment on the ground there was no personal service upon
the defendant. The court held that there was a three year period author-
ized by statute in which to file a petition for review).
117 (1894) 126 Mo. 89, 28 S. W. 963.
118(1895) 63 Mo. App. 1.
lag (1898) 75 Mo. App. 256.
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fact, and being found according to the defendant's complaint it
was manifestly the duty of the court where the suit was prose-
cuted to set aside the judgment rendered in consequence of such
error of fact.
In State ex Tel. v. Clarkson, 120 however, the collector of Howell
county sued the defendant for delinquent taxes, by publication,
alleging that he was a non-resident of the state. Clarkson's deed
was on record in the recorder's office of Howell showing that he
was a resident of Randolph county. The defendant filed a motion
in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis to set aside the
judgment on the ground that the court in rendering the judg-
ment committed an error of fact and had no jurisdiction of the
defendant. The Court of Appeals held that the proof that Clark-
son was not a resident of the state did not prove that the court
committed an error of fact in the rendition of the judgment
fatal to its validity. The judgment of the trial court in over-
ruling the motion was affirmed. It is well to contrast the lan-
guage of the court in this case to that of the preceding cases.
Here they reason by admitting the general proposition that the
writ of error coram nobis will lie when the court has committed
an error of fact vital to its jurisdiction, when said error does not
appear upon the face of the proceedings, and recognizing such
as well settled law. To continue, the court states that it suffi-
ciently appears from the evidence that the appellant was a resi-
dent of the state when the suit was brought but refuses to see
how this fact impeaches the jurisdiction of the court to render
the judgment. Jurisdiction was acquired of the res by the mak-
ing, publishing and proof of the order of publication, and it was
against the res only that the judgment was rendered. To render
the judgment against the land, the jurisdiction was as effectually
conferred as if the appellant had been personally served with
process. To conclude the argument, the proof that appellant was
a resident of the state was not considered to prove or tend to
prove that the court committed an error of fact in the rendition
of the judgment, fatal to its validity. This case received the vis6
of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Simms v. Thompson.12 1 The
residence or non-residence of the defendant was stated to be not
a fact which was material to the right of the court to enter thejudgment. The action of the learned court in State v. Heinrich
and the cases subsequently considered, in treating the motion as
a writ of error coram nobis, was a misconception of the scope
and function of that writ and not in harmony with the later rul-
ings in view of what was said in Simms v. Thompson.' 2 The
later rulings revert back to the argument earlier advanced in this
12 (1901) 88 Mo. App. 553.
121 (1922) 291 Mo. 493, 236 S. W. 876.
122 Ibid.
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discussion, wherein it was pointed out that the cases have now
established that the writ of error coram nobis will lie only when
the court has proceeded in a case as though a fact which was
material to its right to proceed, existed, when it did not exist,
and when the absence of the fact assumed to exist, entirely de-feats the power of the court to obtain a valid result in its pro-
ceeding.
23
FRAUD
In practice, the tendency of many of the decisions has been to
point out that the traditional scope of the writ of error coram
nobis must yield to the preponderant claims of equitable doc-
trines on the modern motion so as to include that of fraud.124
Moreover, it has been intimated that, in addition to fraud, the
grounds of surprise, accident, and mistake might be included
within the motion in the nature of the writ.25
A line of Missouri authorities have affirmed that the remedy
which was originally limited within the scope of the writ of
error coram nobis is now so extended by the invocation of equit-
able doctrines on the modern motion as to include that of fraud
as a legitimate and proper reason for vacating a judgment at a
subsequent term. 26 The remedy obtains on the theory that there
is an inherent power in the courts of common law to vacate judg-
ments for fraud. 27 The line of reasoning seems to proceed on
the basis that irrespective of the limitations of the common law
upon the remedy afforded by writ of error coram nobis, it must
be conceded that under the practice which now generally obtains
in the Missouri courts, judgments are frequently set aside and
vacated at terms of the court subsequent to their rendition upon
motion, not only for reasons which would be valid on writ of
error coram nobis, but for reasons entirely foreign to that remedy
as it existed at common law, and chief among these is for fraud
practiced in procuring the judgment. It seems the exigencies of
hard cases have brought forth these motions, predicated, at least,
upon the motion involved in the writ of error coram nobis, al-
123 See footnote 31, supra.
124 Cross v. Gould (1908) 131 Mo. App. 585, 110 S. W. 672; Fisher v.
Fisher (1905) 114 Mo. App. 627, 90 S. W. 413; Graf v. Dougherty (1909)
139 Mo. App. 56, 120 S. W. 661.
325 Cross v. Gould, supra footnote 124.
126 Spalding v. Meier (1867) 40 Mo. 176; Downing v. Still (1869) 43
Mo. 309; Estes v. Nell (1901) 163 Mo. 157, 63 S. W. 724; State ex rel. v.
Riley (1909) 219 Mo. 667, 118 S. W. 647; Fisher v. Fisher (1905) 114 Mo.
App. 627, 90 S. W. 413; Cross v. Gould (1908) 131 Mo. App. 585, 110 S. W.
672; Shuck v. Lawton (1913) 249 Mo. 168, 155 S. W. 20; Graf v. Dougherty(1909) 139 Mo. App. 36, 120 S. W. 661.
327 Cross v. Gould, supra footnote 126 (As to fraud, it is entirely im-
material whether the statute authorizes the proceeding by motion or not.
Unless it is forbidden, the remedy obtains on the theory that there is an
inherent power in the courts of common law to vacate judgments for fraud).
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though the scope of the remedy administered thereon reaches
far beyond the writ which they are said to supplant. It is said
the practice of summarily administering equitable relief on mo-
tions of this character is certainly justified in Missouri, where,
by the system adopted, the kinds of procedure which obtained
separately at common law and in equity are amalgamated in one
form of action and the different character of relief administered
by the same tribunal.12 At any rate, the practice of setting asidejudgments at a subsequent term on motion in the nature of the
old writ of error coram nobis for fraud practiced in the act of
procuring the judgment has obtained in the courts of this state.
This position seems very plausible and yet, upon analysis, it
appears to be exposed to serious criticism. Praiseworthy, or at
least defensible, as these reasons were, they nevertheless seem
inapplicable to the allowing of the writ of error coram nobis as
the corrective remedy inasmuch as relief lies in the proper chan-
nels. But even conceding fully the correctness of those decisions
as far as the result reached, it seems clear that in view of the
abrupt change in court decisions, the problem is no longer before
us. The trial of the issue of fraud used in preventing a party
from being present and making a defense, as found to be the
case in many instances, is the trial of an issue outside of any
issue involved in the case in which the judgment is rendered.
It is not an issue, and not an issue out of which an error of fact
can arise, which would authorize a writ of error coram nobis.
The decisions constantly hold that the error of fact to be cor-
rected by the writ of error coram nobis must be errors of fact
pertinent to the issues in the case, and not mere extraneous
matters."2 The recent case of Sowers-Taylor v. Collins1 30 points
out that although it is sometimes said that it is not the office of
a writ of error coram nobis to set aside a judgment on the ground
of fraud, this only means that a judgment may not be set aside
when attacked in this manner, on the ground that the court was
induced by fraud to exercise its jurisdiction. If the court has
been misled into supposing that it had jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, and this fact is not apparent from an
inspection of the record, then the writ of error coram nobis will
lie whether the court was misled by fraud or mistake.
A consideration of a few of the cases will, perhaps, clarify the
present position of the courts. In Spalding v. Meier,131 relief was
granted after the term, on motion, by setting aside the judgment
entered after an agreement to continue, which continuance, by
12 Gross v. Gould, supra footnote 126.
1 Schneider v. Schneider (Mo. App. 1925) 273 S. W. 1081; Simms v.
Thompson (1922) 291 Mo. 493, 236 S. W. 876. See footnote 126, supra.
130 (Mo. App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d.) 692.
s' (1867) 40 Mo. 176.
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inadvertence, had not been entered by the clerk. Bliss J., speak-
ing for the Supreme Court in Douming v. Stil' 3 2 said: "The
charge (conspiracy to defraud) is sustained by affidavits, except
as to the conspiracy. The proceedings complained of were with-
out the knowledge of those interested in seeing they were regular.
This matter should have been considered below. The objection
that it can only be inquired into upon petition in the nature of
a bill in equity is not well taken. Though fraud and mistake are
often grounds for relief, yet the proper proceeding in a matter
of this kind is by motion." In Estes v. Nell133 the court stated
it in this way: "The motion or petition, it has been ruled, must
show that the movent or petitioner was prevented from mak-
ing the defense by surprise, accident, mistake, or fraud of the
adversary without fault on his part." In State ex rel. v. Riley,134
the following excerpt from 5 Ency. P1. & Prac. 26, was quoted
approvingly by the Supreme Court as descriptive of the scope
and office of the writ of error coram nobis: "The office of the
writ of coram nobis is to bring the attention of the court to, and
obtain relief from, errors of fact, such as the death of either
party pending suit and before judgment therein, or infancy,
where the party was not properly represented by guardian, or
coverture, where the common-law disability still exists, or in-
sanity, it seems, at the time of trial, or a valid defense existing
in the facts of the case, but which, without negligence on the
part of the defendant, was not made, either through duress or
fraud or excusable mistake; these facts not appearing on the face
of the record, and being such as, if known in season, would have
prevented the rendition and entry of the judgment questioned."
The case of Fisher v. Fisher"35 was one where counsel for the
respective parties agreed that if the cause was called for trial at
the term it should be continued for certain reasons and the matter
adjusted. Later, plaintiff appeared and took judgment by default
without mention of the agreement; plaintiff's council telling the
court that defendant did not desire to defend the suit. The
words of the court through Johnson, J., are very apposite in
this respect:
"The distinction sought to be drawn by plaintiff between
cases arising from fraud in the procurement of the judg-
ment and those based upon other mistakes of fact, both of
which require proof dehors the record, is not founded in
good reason. The principle upon which relief is afforded in
any case, is that the court has been misled, without the in-jured party being negligent, into pronouncing the judg-
132 (1869) 43 Mo. 309.
233 (1901) 163 Mo. 157, 63 S. W. 724.
134 (1909) 219 Mo. 667, 118 S. W. 647.
115 (1905) 114 Mo. App. 627, 90 S. W. 413.
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ment; a thing that he would not have done had he known
the real facts. The judgment so obtained, when the court's
attention has been called to his mistake by proper and timely
motion, should be treated as a nullity, devoid of any sanctity,
and should not be hedged in by the safeguards surrounding
judgments properly obtained."
Next in line is the case of Cross v. Gould.136 The fraud in the
Cross case was that the attorney for the plaintiff wrote the
attorney for defendant, who lived in a distant state, telling him
that he would be notified when the suit would be tried, and that
nothing would be done until he should be notified, but thereafter
when the case was called stated to the court, "Defendants did
not further appear to the action for the reason they recognized
the justice of the plaintiff's claim, and did not intend to contest
it, and were willing to have judgment rendered against them,"
whereupon the court rendered judgment by default. The St.
Louis Court of Appeals followed the doctrine of the Kansas City
Court of Appeals in Fisher v. Fisher and reversed the lower
court and directed to reinstate the motion to set aside the judg-
ment. Shortly after Cross v. Gould, the St. Louis Court of Ap-
peals handed down the decision in Graf v. Dougherty.'' The
ground alleged in support of the motion was that the plaintiff
fraudulently represented to the court that the defendant was a
non-resident of the state and secured notice by publication. The
court stated that it was true that the motion predicated in part
upon equitable grounds which would have no doubt have sup-
ported a bill in equity on the grounds of fraud perpetrated in
the act of procuring the judgment. Nevertheless, the relief sought
was declared to be within the purview of such motions; the mod-
ern motion superseding the ancient writ of error coram nobis.
The latter case received the full sanction of the Supreme Court
in the case of Shuck v. Lowtonm, 38 as an able and acceptable ex-
position of the law in this regard.
Finally, in the case of Jeude v. Sims," 9 the majority of the
Supreme Court rejected the opinion offered by Lamm, C. J., and
reasoned on entirely different lines in the following manner:
"The motion in this case simply sets up that the plain-
tiff's fraudulently misled counsel for the defendants as to
the time of the trial of the cause. Whilst such conduct, if
shown upon a trial by bill in equity to set aside the judg-
ment for fraud, would perhaps be good, yet we fail to find
any case wherein such fact is a ground for the common-law
1-3 (1908) 131 Mo. App. 585, 110 S. W. 672.
237 (1900) 139 Mo. App. 56, 120 S. W. 661.
1,8 (1913) 249 Mo. 168, 155 S. W. 20.
139 (1914) 258 Mo. 26, 166 S. W. 1048.
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writ of error coam nobis. * * * The errors of fact to be
corrected by the writ of error coram nobis must be errors
of fact pertinent to the issues in the case, and not mere
extraneous matters."
Then came Simms v. Thompson.1 40 Cross v. Gould, insofar as
it held that fraud appearing in that case was sufficient upon
which to base a writ of error coram nobis, was expressly disap-
proved by Simms v. Thompson. It was said that relief was not
granted in Missouri on the grounds of fraud, and doubtless
would not be on the ground of mistake or accident, those being
distinct grounds of relief in equity. The Fisher case was not
mentioned in Simms v. Thompson and was not overruled in so
many words, but the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Ragland
v. Ragland,141 relied upon Simms v. Thompson as a proper ex-
position of the law and overruled its former decision in Fisher
v. Fisher. In the Ragland case it was said that relief would not
be granted in a motion in the nature of a writ of error coram
nobis where there was fraud in the procurement of a judgment.
This position was again taken by the case of Hartford Ins. Co.
v. Stanfi/l142 where the court was of the opinion that it was now
definitely settled that relief was not granted by writ of error
coram nobis in Missouri on the ground of fraud. Here the ap-
pellant sought to set aside an order of dismissal for the reason
that appellant's attorney fraudulently procured the dismissal.
The appellant was denied the application for the writ of error
coram nobis and was relegated to his proper remedy. The St.
Louis Court of Appeals again affirmed the proposition of the
aforementioned cases and the case of Schneider v. Schneider,'43
ruling that the common-law writ of error coram nobis is not
available to obtain relief from fraud. It remained for the court
to modify this general attitude which they did in Sowers-Taylor
Co. V. Collins.144 The court here held that although it is some-
times said that it is not the office of the writ of error coram
nobis to set aside the judgment on the ground of fraud; this
only means that a judgment may not be set aside when attacked
in this manner, on the ground that the court was induced by
fraud to exercise its jurisdiction. If the court has been misled
into supposing that it had jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, and this fact is not apparent from an inspection of
140 (1922) 291 Mo. 493, 236 S. W. 876.
141 (Mo. App. 1924) 258 S. W. 728.
142 (Mo. App. 124) 259 S. W. 867.
143 (Mo. App. 1925) 273 S. W. 1081 (motion to set aside a judgment for
alimony on the ground that plaintiff fraudulently concealed a property
settlement from the court. The court held that the writ of error is no
longer available, in this state, for relief on the ground of fraud).
144 (Mo. App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d.) 692.
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the record, then the writ of coram nobis will lie whether the
court has been misled through mistake or fraud.
CONCLUSION
This article is not intended as an attack on any of the decisions
of the courts, nor on the use of coram nobis. It is simply an
effort to call attention to the fact that the so-called law of coram
nobis still persists as a necessary part of the practice and pro-
cedure in Missouri. For our own purposes if it were felt that the
present day motion completely supplanted the old writ of error
coram nobis, it would seem that the rational procedure would
be to cease speaking in terms of coram nobis, but its language
has been carried through the books from Calloway v. Nifong145
to G. M. A. C. v. Lyman,16 of the present year. However, once
convinced of the propriety of the relief, there need be no worry
as to the mode of attaining it through the function of writ of
error coram nobis via the motion route. For this reason, the
granting of the motion should be exercised with the utmost cau-
tion and the grounds for the motion must be certain and definite,
and restricted to such cases as where the facts to be presented
are such that if those facts had been presented to the court at
the original trial, the judgment rendered would not have been
rendered.
J. CHARLES CRAWLEY '35.
IMPLIED POWERS OF LICENSE REVOCATION BY
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
I.
American legislatures in many instances have provided for the
licensing of business, trades and acts to be performed by indi-
viduals., Express legislative provisions for the revocation of
licenses are, however, "meager and haphazard." 2 "There is no
consistent legislative policy in any one jurisdiction concerning
revocability or non-revocability, grounds of revocation, character
of the revoking body, or appeal.... There are few fields in which
there is more room and need for doing constructive work in the
way of building up correct principles of legislation." Freund
says that the work would involve, among others, this question,
145 (1822) 1 Mo. 223.
146 (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d.) 109.
1 Freund, Police Power, sec. 493; "Current Legislation", 22 Col. L. Rev.
269.
2 Freund, Legislative Regulation, p. 294.
Ibid. See also Freund, Administrative Powers Over Persons and Prop-
erty, sec. 64.
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